We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-014-9862-0">Environmental and Resource Economics</A> (forthcoming).<P> We study coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an IEA for environmental issues in the Coalitional Bargaining Game (CBG) of Gomes 2005, Econometrica). For the general CBG, we...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in an article in <I>Economics Letters</I> (2007). Vol. 96, pp. 316-324.<P> The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for...</p></i>

See also 'Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Bargaining' in <I>Economic Theory</I> (2001). Volume 17, p. 81-99).<P> Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in asimple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding tomilitant union behaviour...</p></i>

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>International Game Theory Review</I> (2008), 10, 257-278.<P> This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers...</p></i>

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

See also 'Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences', <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011), Vol. 73, pp.507–516.<P> We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect...</p></i>