We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents' learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and...

We study markets where innovators can sell ideas to entrepreneurs, who may be better at implementing them. These markets are decentralized, with random matching and bargaining. Entrepreneurs hold liquid assets lest potentially profitable opportunities may be lost. We extend existing models of...

Prior to 1863, state chartered banks in the United States issued notes -- dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at the discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the...

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is charaterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments...