We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky security. We relate this measure to consumers' endowment and attributes and to measures of background risk and liquidity constraints. We...

Abstract: Focusing on observable default risk's role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior, this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk-based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid-1990s. It tests three resulting predictions....

Saving rates have fallen steadily in the U.S. since the 1970s. The literature has proposed numerous possible explanations for the decrease including increases in governmental insurance, changes in the distribution of income, and increases in annuitized wealth. Analysis of all three explanations...

We construct a bilateral search model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow rewards while searching. Buyers and sellers enter the market with high flow rewards, but move at a Poisson rate to a state with low flow rewards if they do not transact in the meantime. We...

Reputation systems have emerged as important sources of information in modern economies. This paper develops a model of reputation systems that puts buyers and sellers inside a stochastic environment involving asymmetric information and search frictions, and gives them a set of options with...

We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information in a dynamic beauty contest model when they do not observe aggregate variables, such as prices or quantities, but randomly observe each other's actions. We solve for the market equilibrium and find that the average learning...

This paper addresses the output-price volatility puzzle by studying the interaction of optimal monetary policy and agents' beliefs. We assume that agents choose their information acquisition rate by minimizing a loss function that depends on expected forecast errors and information costs....