Showing 1 - 10 of 27
This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ball process. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods and money. We compare...
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In this paper we investigate the effects of government budget deficit restrictions in a finite horizon model with imperfect consumer credit market. When financial markets are perfect anonymous lump-sum taxes are sufficient to achieve irrelevance of government budget deficit restrictions in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090895
This paper explores the extent to which markets constrain intertemporal preferences. First, we show that without transaction costs, agents are immune to exploitation in competitive markets. In particular, a sequence of trades leaving any market participant strictly worse off (termed a money...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085442
This paper studies equilibrium portfolios in the standard neoclassical growth model under uncertainty with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete markets. Preferences are purposely restricted to be quasi-homothetic. The main source of heterogeneity across agents is due to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051278
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We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is charaterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090931
This research introduces the sequential bargaining to the standard screening model by allowing the agent to propose new contracts with strategic delay after the rejection of the principal's offer. We have found that if the difference between the types of agent are sufficiently large, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069296