In this paper, we analyze the problem of store design when consumers have preferences with temptation and self-control, as introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). We say that a monopolist designs its stores when it chooses the number of stores to open and the quality and price of the goods to...

We propose a theory of unsecured debt that is based on the existence of private information about a person's type and on the fact that some debtors have the incentive to forego bankruptcy in order to signal their type. The theory formalizes the idea that the type of a person is relevant to...

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance contracts when agents can exert search effort but have private information about their search technology. We derive a recursive solution of our adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions under which the UI agency should...

This paper generalizes the standard habit formation model to an environment in which agents form habits over individual varieties of goods as opposed to over a composite consumption good. We refer to this preference specification as ‘deep habit formation’. Under deep habits, the demand...

We determine empirically how the Big Three automakers accommodate shocks to demand. They have the capability to change prices, alter labor inputs through temporary layoffs and overtime, or adjust inventories. These adjustments are interrelated, non-convex, and dynamic in nature. Combining weekly...

This paper considers the effects of a monopolist raising the cost of entry for potential competitors on Markov-perfect industry dynamics. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, which they partially recover when exiting. Empirically, the probability of exit declines with the...