We study a multiperiod principal-agent problem with moral hazard in which the agent is required to exert effort only in the initial period of the contract. The effort choice of the agent in this first period determines the conditional distribution of output in the following periods. The paper...

Asset markets are characterized by slow booms and sudden crashes. Lending rates, for example, are more likely to experience big jumps rather than big drops. We focus on the comparison of this pattern across countries. First, we document that lending rates are more asymmetric on economies with...

This research introduces the sequential bargaining to the standard screening model by allowing the agent to propose new contracts with strategic delay after the rejection of the principal's offer. We have found that if the difference between the types of agent are sufficiently large, the...

An important finding of the new dynamic public finance literature is the validity of Atkinson and Stiglitz' uniform commodity tax prescription in a dynamic Mirrleesian setting. However, this need not apply to the taxation of goods across time, i.e., the taxation of savings. We model an...

This paper analyzes the equilibrium trading strategies of informed traders in the presence of market closures defined as periodic predictable stops of trading. We construct a dynamic auction model based on rational strategic behavior with asymmetric information across the agents. Empirical...

We consider an environment in which a government implements a sequence of tax mechanisms that assign allocations to a population of privately informed agents. These mechanisms are determined by a process of electoral competition with agents voting over political candidate-mechanism pairs in each...

This paper characterizes optimal renegotiation proof public perfect equilibrium in a repeated partnership game. The model was originally introduced by Mobius. Players have random arrival of endowments which are privately observed that are more valued by the partner than the player receiving the...

We compare the costs and benefits of profit-sharing partnerships relative to the corporate form of organization. We show that organizing as a partnership can be desirable in human-capital intensive industries where product quality is hard to observe. The theory explains the relative scarcity of...