Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. This paper examines modern bank runs, in which withdrawals typically take the form of wire...

Features of sovereign debts restructuring in 1980s and 1990s are quite different in two aspects. One is that the renegotiation periods are longer in 1980s than in 1990s, in spite of the fact that sovereign borrowing in 1980s is mainly bank loans with several big creditors, while in 1990s it is...

This paper examines the role of bank lending in the transmission of monetary policy in the presence of capital adequacy regulations. I develop a dynamic model of bank asset and liability management that incorporates risk-based capital requirements and an imperfect market for bank equity. These...

In this paper, I examine the implications of collateral constraints in a production economy and demonstrate that collateral constraints may have a role to play in resolving two outstanding puzzles: the risk-free rate puzzle and the total factor productivity puzzle. The first puzzle, as noted by...

Evidence suggests that banks, like firms, face financial frictions when raising funds. In this paper, we develop a quantitative, monetary business cycle model in which agency problems affect both the relationship between banks and firms as well as that linking banks to their depositors. As a...

We study banking policy credibility in a variant of the Diamond and Dybvig (JPE, 1983) model. By committing to temporarily close banks during a run, suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency, the banking authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run as an equilibrium...