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Amador, Manuel; Angeletos, George-Marios; Werning, Ivan - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper studies the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in an intertemporal consumption … value for flexibility - but also expect to suffer from temptations - generating a value for commitment. The model combines … the representations of preferences for flexibility introduced by Kreps (1979) with its recent antithesis for commitment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090888

Store Design with Self-Control Preferences

Esteban, Susanna - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

In this paper, we analyze the problem of store design when consumers have preferences with temptation and self-control, as introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). We say that a monopolist designs its stores when it chooses the number of stores to open and the quality and price of the goods to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085470

Trading favors: optimal exchange and forgiveness.

Hopenhayn, Hugo A.; Hauser, Christine - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper characterizes optimal renegotiation proof public perfect equilibrium in a repeated partnership game. The model was originally introduced by Mobius. Players have random arrival of endowments which are privately observed that are more valued by the partner than the player receiving the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069463

Temptation and Self-Control: Some Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey

Huang, Kevin X.D.; Liu, Zheng - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027226

Capital Mobility, Property Rights and Economic Development

Jeanne, Olivier; Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090886

Dynamic Contracts for Teams

Chung, Kim-Sau; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper studies repeated moral hazard in teams. Agents' actions are observable to each other but not to the principal. For any given dynamic contract, agents always select their favorite subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding dynamic game. The optimal dynamic contract must take that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090913

Rational Multi-Agent Search

Blume, Andreas; Franco, April; Heidhues, Paul - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051236

Unpleasant Implications of Insecure Property for Optimal Fiscal Policy and Growth

Neary, Hugh; Gonzalez, Francisco M. - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

Received wisdom maintains that LDCs ought to pursue pro-growth fiscal policy if it is incentive-feasible. We extend a standard model of growth to include imperfect, endogenously determined, property rights, and re-examine the welfare consequences of fiscal policy. Contrary to conventional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051409

Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy

Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban; Antras, Pol; Garicano, Luis - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027218

Markovian Optimal Taxation

Ortigueira, Salvador - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

two assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment, which in turn define two notions of time … consistency of the Markov policy. Our results show that the extent of government's intra-period commitment has important …, different degrees of government's intra-period commitment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085471