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Dynamic Optimal Non-linear Taxation Under Non-commitment

Tsyvinski, Aleh; Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448

Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government

Rampini, Adriano; Bisin, Alberto - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970332

Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Finance

Hellwig, Martin F. - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2004

The paper studies the role of income taxes and admission fees in financing excludable and nonexcludable public goods in a large economy. A renegotiation proofness condition makes the multidimensional Bayesian mechanism design problem tractable. Resulting formulae for optimal income taxes and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970346

Ramsey Meets Hosios: The Optimal Capital Tax and Labor Market Efficiency

Arseneau, David M.; Chugh, Sanjay K. - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

Heterogeneity between unemployed and employed individuals matters for optimal fiscal policy. This paper considers the … consequences of welfare heterogeneity between these two groups for the determination of optimal capital and labor income taxes in a … that arises from search and matching frictions. However, the consideration of heterogeneity makes our result differ in an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069214

Optimal Wealth Taxes with Risky Human Capital

Grochulski, Borys; Piskorski, Tomasz - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We study the structure of optimal wedges and wealth taxes in a Mirrleesian economy with endogenous skills. Human capital is a private state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we assume that human capital investment is a)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069250

Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms

Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Michael; Tsyvinski, Oleg - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We study the optimal Mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy with idiosyncratic (productivity or preference) shocks. In contrast to the standard approach, which implicitly assumes that the mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power, we assume that any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069251

Does competition for (human) capital discipline governments? The role of commitment

Armenter, Roc; Ortega, Francesc - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We argue that labor mobility does not lead to a ''race to the bottom,'' where countries drastically cut redistributive transfers in order to attract skilled workers. The basis of our argument is that these cuts are not credible policies. We propose a two country model where competition for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069270

Dynamic Optimal Taxation: A Robust Analysis

Kocherlakota, Narayana; Phelan, Christopher - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

Following the seminal work of Mirrlees (REStud, 1971), there has been a large amount of work on how to design an optimal tax system when agents' skills are private information. This literature makes a strong assumption: it assumes that the data generation process for skills in the economy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069283

Yet Another Reason to Tax Goods

Costa, Carlos E. da - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

An important finding of the new dynamic public finance literature is the validity of Atkinson and Stiglitz' uniform commodity tax prescription in a dynamic Mirrleesian setting. However, this need not apply to the taxation of goods across time, i.e., the taxation of savings. We model an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069325

Poltically credible taxation

Sleet, Christopher; Yeltekin, Sevin - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We consider an environment in which a government implements a sequence of tax mechanisms that assign allocations to a population of privately informed agents. These mechanisms are determined by a process of electoral competition with agents voting over political candidate-mechanism pairs in each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069344