This paper shows how expectations-driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation. The model of Morris and Shin (1998) is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market. If speculators believe that a...

We propose a theory of unsecured debt that is based on the existence of private information about a person's type and on the fact that some debtors have the incentive to forego bankruptcy in order to signal their type. The theory formalizes the idea that the type of a person is relevant to...

Asset prices display high covariance relative to the covariance of their payoffs. (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993; Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2002) Many take this ‘excess covariance’ to be evidence of investor irrationality. This model reconciles the high covariance with a rational...

Currencies that are at a forward premium tend to depreciate. This `forward premium-depreciation anomaly' represents an egregious deviation from uncovered interest parity. We document the returns to currency speculation strategies that exploit this anomaly. The first strategy, known as the carry...

This paper presents a fully rational general equilibrium model that produces a time-varying exchange rate risk premium and solves the uncovered interest rate parity (U.I.P) puzzle. In this two-country model, agents are characterized by slow-moving external habit preferences similar to Campbell &...

Labour markets in different regions or countries vary significantly with respect to turnover rates, remuneration practices, investment in general and firm-specific human capital, and the frequency of employee-driven start-ups. Examples include the Silicon Valley versus Route 128 in the US, and...

Central counterparties (CCPs) have increasingly become a cornerstone of financial markets infrastructure. We present a model where CCPs are necessary to implement efficient trade when trades are time-critical, liquidity is limited and there is limited enforcement of trades. We then show that --...

This paper studies the provision of incentives to reallocate capital when managers are reluctant to relinquish control and have private information about the productivity of assets under their control. We show that when managers get private benefits from running projects substantial bonuses are...

Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulatory reform have advocated to put more outsiders on the board. The rationale of this measure is that outsiders are more independent, while a potential drawback is that they might not know enough about the firm to be effective monitors. Having information about the...