Showing 1 - 10 of 54
We propose to experimentally study decentralized organization learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of other agents. An important distinction of our approach is that we test predictions from...
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Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the voting franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We specify a class of dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time. Each period, private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090912
This paper develops a joint theory of ideology and redistributive policy to account for the striking divergence found across countries in voters? attitudes about the causes of individual wealth and poverty (self-reliance or societal forces), as well as in the observed social contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090916
This paper studies Holmstrom's [1999] seminal model of career concerns, but considers that a small change in the beliefs about the agent's future productivity may imply a large change in his compensation---because, for example, the agent may be fired or promoted. This allows us to study how the...
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Bismarckian social security systems are associated with larger public pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than Beveridgean systems. This paper introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for all these features. Agents differ in age,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051414
I combine two previously separate strands of the bargaining literature to present a bargaining model with both one-sided private information and a majority vote for proposals to go into effect. I use this model to show that the US bankruptcy code produces shorter delays and higher welfare than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051426