We consider a full equilibrium model in continuous time comprising a finite number of agents and tradable securities.We show that, if the agents’ endowments are spanned by the securities and if the agents have entropic utilities, an equilibrium exists and the agents’ optimal trading...

Lack of transparency in securitization transactions significantly contributed to the severe financial crisis of 2007–2009. To increase transparency we propose a new mechanism: financial claims with fingerprints. They would allow market participants at each stage of the securitization process...

We provide results on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamically incomplete financial markets in discrete time. Our framework allows for heterogeneous agents, unspanned random endowments and convex trading constraints. In the special case where all agents have preferences of the...

In this paper we deal with the utility maximization problem with a general utility function. We derive a new approach in which we reduce the utility maximization prob- lem with general utility to the study of a fully-coupled Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (FBSDE).

Supported by several recent investigations, the empirical pricing kernel (EPK) puzzle might be considered a stylized fact. Based on an economic model with state dependent preferences for the financial investors, we want to emphasize a microeconomic view that succeeds in explaining the puzzle. We...

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A consumer standard alleviates the regulator’s myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent’s ex ante...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

We reconsider the canonical model of price setting with menu costs by Ball and Romer (1990). Their original model exhibits multiple equilibria for nominal aggregate demand shocks of intermediate size. By abandoning Ball and Romer’s (1990) assumption that demand shocks are common knowledge...