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Why the rich are nastier than the poor : a note on optimal punishment

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998

Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in individuals, own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of others.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574881

The relevance of equal splits : on a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games

Güth, Werner; Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998

The findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574884

To commit or not to commit : endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580476

Stackelberg beats Cournot : on collusion and efficiency in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

each market we implement both a random matching and fixed-pairs version. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the … matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets. Under random matching total quantities in Stackelberg markets are higher … prediction. Under fixed pairs aggregate output for both, Cournot and Stackelberg, is lower than under random matching, but there …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580482

Divisionalization in contests

Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000

To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. -- contests ; Divisionalization ; delegation

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582389

On the profitability of collusion in location games

Huck, Steffen; Knoblauch, Vicky; Müller, Wieland - 2000

On the basis of a real high stakes insurance experiment with small probabilities of losses, we demonstrate that concern is a more important driver of WTP for insurance than subjective probability estimates when there is ambiguity surrounding the estimate. Concern is still important when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583427