In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...

Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...

When people decide about saving and consumption across the various periods of their life time they take into account their life expectancy when comparing present and future needs and resources for satisfying them. The experimental design, applied at two sites (Humboldt-University at Berlin and...

Individuals frequently transfer commodities without an explicit contract or an implicit enforcement mechanism. We design an experiment to study whether such commodity transfers can be viewed as investments based on trust and reciprocity, or whether they rather resemble presents with...

An investor faced with a contingent claim may eliminate risk by (super-)hedging in a financial market. As this is often quite expensive, we study partial hedges, which require less capital and reduce the risk. In a previous paper we determined quantile hedges which succeed with maximal...

Consider a d-dimensional Brownian motion X (Xl, ... ,Xd ) and a function F which belongs locally to the Sobolev space W 1,2. We prove an extension of Ito's formula where the usual second order terms are replaced by the quadratic covariations [fk(X), Xkj involving the weak first partial...

We introduce the notion of a convex measure of risk, an extension of the concept of a coherent risk measure defined in Artzner et aL (1999), and we prove a corresponding extension of the representation theorem in terms of probability measures on the underlying space of scenarios. As a case...

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem. There is evidence that risk attitudes depend on...