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Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach

Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475

A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games : an experimental study

Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - 2002

In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627290

An experimental analysis of equal punishment games

Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner - 1999

In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581099

An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Engelmann, Dirk - 1999

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582410

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426

On the regulation of social norms

Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884

From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001

choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that … theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main … point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562

On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner - 2000

Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612014

Why the rich are nastier than the poor : a note on optimal punishment

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998

Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in individuals, own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of others.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574881

The relevance of equal splits : on a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games

Güth, Werner; Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998

The findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574884