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Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?
Kübler, Dorothea - 1997
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470
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Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010
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Integrating a behavioral preference calculus into a simultaneous market entry game : analyses of equilibria for selected cases of prior gain and loss experiences
Schröder, Andreas; Schade, Christian D. - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621418
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Job stability trends and labor market (re-)entry in West Germany 1984 - 1997
Mertens, Antje - 1999
This paper investigates whether job stability in western Germany shows any signs of decline and compares the findings to evidence for the US and the UK. Cross sectional data and calendar information from the German Socioeconomic Panel 1984-1997 are combined allowing to check possible influences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580458
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. -- auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882
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Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876
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On model based seasonal adjustment procedures
Breitung, Jörg - 1998
In this note the unobserved component approach underlying the software package SEATS is compared with the Beveridge-Nelson type of decomposition for seasonal time series. The main strength of the SEATS approach lies in the appealing model formulation and the careful specification and adjustment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574877
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The monetary model of the exchange rate : a structural interpretation
Moersch, Mathias; Nautz, Dieter - 1998
We emphasize the importance of properly identifying the long-run relations underlying the monetary model of the exchange rate. The separate estimation of long-run money demands leads to a "structural" error correction equation which allows an interpretation of the various channels affecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574885
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Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886