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Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach
Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999
that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475
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On the regulation of social norms
Kübler, Dorothea - 2000
A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
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From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001
choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that … theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main … point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562
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Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?
Kübler, Dorothea - 1997
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470
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Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010
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Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices
Kirman, Alan P.; Härdle, Wolfgang; Schulz, Rainer; … - 2002
This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624846
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An experimental analysis of equal punishment games
Ahlert, Marlies; Crüger, Arwed; Güth, Werner - 1999
In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581099
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How ultimatum offers emerge : a study in bounded rationality
Güth, Werner - 2000
The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaptation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583892
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On the evolution of power indices in collective bargaining
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner - 2000
Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612014
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Alternating offer bargaining experiments with varying institutional details
Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Marchand, Nadège - 2001
The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612565