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Capacity choices and price competition in experimental markets
Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Kamecke, Ulrich; … - 2001
setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Capacities converge above the Cournot level. Sellers rarely manage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612564
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Presents or investments? : an experimental analysis
Genîzî, Ûrî; Güth, Werner; Verboven, Frank - 1998
.’s investment game by introducing an upper bound to what a contributor can be repaid afterwards. By varying this upper bound …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578011
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Nonparametric estimation and testing of interaction in additive models
Sperlich, Stefan; Tjostheim, Dag; Yang, Lijian - 1998
We consider an additive model with second order interaction terms. It is shown how the components of this model can be estimated using marginal integration, and the asymptotic distribution of the estimators is derived. Moreover, two test statistics for testing the presence of interactions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574875
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On estimation of monotone and concave frontier functions
Gijbels, Irène; Mammen, Enno; Park, Byeong U.; Simar, … - 1998
When analyzing the productivity of firms, one may want to compare how the firms transform a set of inputs x (typically labor, energy or capital) into an output y (typically a quantity of goods produced). The economic efficiency of a firm is then defined in terms of its ability of operating close...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574880
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Optimal consumption choice for ratchet investors
Riedel, Frank - 2001
The utility maximization problem of "ratchet investors" who do not tolerate any decline in their consumption rate is solved explicitly for all felicity functions in a Markovian framework which includes Brownian motion and Poisson processes as special cases. The optimal consumption plan turns out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009616776
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Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward
Güth, Werner; Königstein, Manfred; Marchand, Nadège; … - 2000
contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who … receives the investment is the one who may reward the investor. This is a direct reward game. Similar to Dufwenberg et al … investor may only be rewarded by a third person who did not receive his investment. Furthermore we investigate the influence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612013
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Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876
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On model based seasonal adjustment procedures
Breitung, Jörg - 1998
In this note the unobserved component approach underlying the software package SEATS is compared with the Beveridge-Nelson type of decomposition for seasonal time series. The main strength of the SEATS approach lies in the appealing model formulation and the careful specification and adjustment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574877
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The monetary model of the exchange rate : a structural interpretation
Moersch, Mathias; Nautz, Dieter - 1998
We emphasize the importance of properly identifying the long-run relations underlying the monetary model of the exchange rate. The separate estimation of long-run money demands leads to a "structural" error correction equation which allows an interpretation of the various channels affecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574885
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Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886