Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612014
This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. The special feature of the data is that we have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. Each offer, counteroffer and refusal conveys...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009624846
In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581099
The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the "Master Module" as well as its submodules "New Problem Solver", "Adaptation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583892
The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in a given round has ultimatum power. We study experimentally eight such bargaining games. Each game is once repeated before moving on to the next one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612565
On May 11, 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector-mode: Each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM 1.000-pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM 100, 200, ..., 900...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614299
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be … profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the … number of contestants. -- contests ; merger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582395
We propose a model in which mergers exert a more pronounced effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The results help to reconcile theory with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583894