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Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884

Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?

Kübler, Dorothea - 1997

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470

An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Engelmann, Dirk - 1999

reputation formation, this game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analysed since participants play successively several … which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582410

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Auctions and corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882

Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? : an indirect evolutionary analysis

Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.

The evolution of trustworthiness as a major aspect of business ethics depends crucially on whether it can be signaled. If this is impossible, only opportunistic traders will survive. Whereas previous studies have analysed detection agencies (Güth and Kliemt, 1994 and 1998) or have substituted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578022

Will banks promote trade? : equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks

Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Peter - 1998 - Rev.

according to which banks are not used at all. By applying the theory of equilibrium selection it is analysed which of the two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578562

An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information

Dufwenberg, Martin; Genîzî, Ûrî; Güth, Werner; … - 2000

Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583886

Quantile hedging

Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998

In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876

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