Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 260
Cover Image
On the regulation of social norms
Kübler, Dorothea - 2000
A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
Cover Image
From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001
choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that … theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main … point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562
Cover Image
Multiple politico-economic regimes, inequality and growth
Desdoigts, Alain; Moizeau, Fabien - 2001
In this paper, we abandon the stylized median voter and study (i) how distributional tensions can act in many different ways depending on social affinity and on the prospect of upward or downwardmobility of the different income classes, (ii) income distribution dynamics, intergenerational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615432
Cover Image
Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886
Cover Image
Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach
Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999
that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475
Cover Image
Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation : a comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions
Dufwenberg, Martin; Güth, Werner - 1997
The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657129
Cover Image
Retributive responses
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel - 2001
Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612563
Cover Image
Fairness versus efficiency : an experimental study of (mutual) gift giving
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel - 2000
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612570
Cover Image
Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory
Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2000
We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612571
Cover Image
Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876