Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

A model of herding behavior on the labor market is discussed where employers only receive signals with limited precision about the workers' types, but can observe previous employers' decisions. In particular, we study a situation where the employer and the worker can influence the signal...

Starting from the objective of banking supervision - to minimize the overall costs of banking to the general public - we show that the current standard of quantifying market risk is flawed. It is perfectly aligned with the interests of banks' shareholders and management, but not with the...

Qualitative and quantitative properties of the Cornish-Fisher-Expansion in the context of Delta-Gamma-Normal approaches to the computation of Value at Risk are presented. Some qualitative deficiencies of the Cornish-Fisher-Expansion - the monotonicity of the distribution function as well as...

This paper entertains the notion that disturbances on the demand side play a central role in our understanding of the Great Depression. In fact, from Euler equation residuals we are able to identify a series of unusually large negative demand shocks that appeared to have hit the U. S. economy...