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Experimental "beauty contests" with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2001
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614296
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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999
In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary … incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106
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Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.
employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative to reviewing statistical data, we have performed an experiment with a … lower competitive wage in the second phase of an employment relationship that is known to both parties. The experiment casts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579
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The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000
experiment where respondents have to detect corner solutions, that is, they should allocate to the venture either the maximum or … Allocation Strategy ; Entrepreneurship ; Questionnaire Experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426
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Through trial & error to collusion
Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461
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Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
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Absent–minded drivers in the lab : testing Gilboa’s model
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 2000
implement his model of the absent-minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583877
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Hotelling games with three, four, and more players
Brenner, Steffen - 2001
In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613612
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research
Güth, Sandra; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - 2000
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612010