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The Trust Game describes a situation where mutually beneficial trade is endangered by opportunistic exploitation. In the Trust Game with Banks this dilemma can be avoided by banks guaranteeing that sellers will be paid. This outcome is, however, not the only possible solution. Bank interference...
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significantly mutual cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612013
A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
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Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than "the rest of us"? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound "rational choice" answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657895
Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581088
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886
In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613612
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614296