The Trust Game describes a situation where mutually beneficial trade is endangered by opportunistic exploitation. In the Trust Game with Banks this dilemma can be avoided by banks guaranteeing that sellers will be paid. This outcome is, however, not the only possible solution. Bank interference...

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally...

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...

Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in individuals, own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of others.

The findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results. In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995). Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were...