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A note on the E-mail game : bounded rationality and induction

Dulleck, Uwe - 1997

In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 1998

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578001

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence

Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579

Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Peleg, Bezalel - 1998

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578580

Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better

Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 1997

Can a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than "the rest of us"? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound "rational choice" answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657895

An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information

Dufwenberg, Martin; Genîzî, Ûrî; Güth, Werner; … - 2000

Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583886

Hotelling games with three, four, and more players

Brenner, Steffen - 2001

In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613612

From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001

choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that … theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main … point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562

Robust learning experiments : evidence for learning and deliberation

Güth, Werner - 2000

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612041

Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach

Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475