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Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
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A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games : an experimental study
Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - 2002
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We … show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without … punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627290
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Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.
employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative to reviewing statistical data, we have performed an experiment with a … lower competitive wage in the second phase of an employment relationship that is known to both parties. The experiment casts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579
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The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000
experiment where respondents have to detect corner solutions, that is, they should allocate to the venture either the maximum or … Allocation Strategy ; Entrepreneurship ; Questionnaire Experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426
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Experimental "beauty contests" with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2001
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614296
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Why the rich are nastier than the poor : a note on optimal punishment
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 1998
Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in individuals, own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of others.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574881
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Bidder preferences among auction institutions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim - 2002
This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627275
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Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron - 2001
the two mechanisms for the symmetric case. We show that subjects in a computerized experiment prefer the two-bid auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615428
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Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102
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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999
In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106