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On the regulation of social norms
Kübler, Dorothea - 2000
introduced (e.g. fines or subsidies imposed by government agencies) to violate existing norms or follow a new code of behavior … inappropriate or that following a certain new norm is appropriate. Both forms of norm regulation are incorporated into Akerlof …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
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From full to bounded rationality : the limits of unlimited rationality
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2001
choice making. We illustrate why this role is not being fulfilled well by standard models of full rationality and that … theories of bounded rationality are needed not only for better predictions, but also for developing better advice. Our main … point is that one cannot succeed here without studying how theories of bounded rationality causally influence the behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612562
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Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach
Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999
that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475
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Retributive responses
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel - 2001
Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612563
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Fairness versus efficiency : an experimental study of (mutual) gift giving
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Ockenfels, Axel - 2000
Fairness is a strong concern as shown by the robust results of dictator giving and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is another potential concern in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma and public good provision games. In our experiment participants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612570
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Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory
Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2000
We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612571
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Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876
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On model based seasonal adjustment procedures
Breitung, Jörg - 1998
In this note the unobserved component approach underlying the software package SEATS is compared with the Beveridge-Nelson type of decomposition for seasonal time series. The main strength of the SEATS approach lies in the appealing model formulation and the careful specification and adjustment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574877
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The monetary model of the exchange rate : a structural interpretation
Moersch, Mathias; Nautz, Dieter - 1998
We emphasize the importance of properly identifying the long-run relations underlying the monetary model of the exchange rate. The separate estimation of long-run money demands leads to a "structural" error correction equation which allows an interpretation of the various channels affecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574885
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Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886