competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more … presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several …

) auctions are analysed. The analysis focuses on the strategic aspect of the bidding process, i.e. the game-theoretic auction …This paper surveys the literature on auctions. To a large part it is concerned with revenue and efficiency … considerations. It addresses the problems of finding the auction that yields the greatest expected revenues to the auctioneer and …

well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers. -- auctions ; procurement …We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market … game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …

This paper gives an account of events, and explains some systematic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland …. Apart from general market developments, which could not have been anticipated, we argue that auction design which was … introduced in England and adopted in Switzerland and elsewhere is a cause of the disappointing performance of many UMTS auctions …

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger … and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction …, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. -- Auctions …

the converse is not generally true. Moreover, first- and second-price auctions are not always revenue equivalent. Indeed … diseconomies. -- auctions ; procurements ; sequential auctions ; economies of scale …

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to … experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong … the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing …

We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may … the two mechanisms for the symmetric case. We show that subjects in a computerized experiment prefer the two-bid auction … over the one-bid auction when given the possibility of choosing among the two and we claim that this and other aspects of …