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Through trial & error to collusion
Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461
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Does cascade behavior in information cascades reflect Bayesian updating? : an experimental study
Oberhammer, Clemens; Stiehler, Andreas - 2001
Updating behavior in cascade experiments is usually investigated on the basis of urn prediction. But urn predictions alone can only provide a very rough information on individual updating behavior. Therefore, we implement a BDM mechanism. Subjects have to submit maximum prices that they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613603
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Simultaneous over- and underconfidence : evidence from experimental asset markets
Maciejovsky, Boris; Kirchler, Erich - 2001
In this paper individual overconfidence within the context of an experimental asset market is investigated. Overall, 72 participants traded one risky asset on six markets of 12 participants each. The results indicate that individuals were not generally overconfident. Moreover, overconfidence was...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614297
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Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?
Kübler, Dorothea - 1997
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470
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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999
In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106
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Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different … than single bids. This allows us to examine whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102
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Robust learning experiments : evidence for learning and deliberation
Güth, Werner - 2000
Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612041
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Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory
Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2000
We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612571
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Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust
Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Peleg, Bezalel - 1998
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578580
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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment
Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999
Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472