We consider simple models of financial markets with regular traders and insiders possessing some extra information hidden in a random variable which is accessible to the regular trader only at the end of the trading interval. The problems we focus on are the calculation of the additional utility...

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these...

We consider an investor maximizing his expected utility from terminal wealth with portfolio decisions based on the available information flow. This investor faces the opportunity to acquire some additional initial information G.. The subjective fair value of this information for the investor is...