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Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

I want you! : an experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power

Brandts, Jordi; Güth, Werner; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625802

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

administered incentives. -- principal agent ; experiment ; specific human capital …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432

Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?

Kübler, Dorothea - 1997

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470

Auctions and corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882

On the regulation of social norms

Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884

Corporate restructuring, downsizing and managerial compensation

Graßhoff, Ulrike; Schwalbach, Joachim - 1997

that compensation contracts in public corporations seem imperfectly tied to firm performance and managers' tasks. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578030

Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better

Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 1997

formation the complex interactions between "moral" intrinsic motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic "formal … theory ; Intrinsic motivation ; Court system ; Legal litigation ; Hobbesian problem of social order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657895