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contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
In der vorliegenden Untersuchung betrachten wir die Grundgesamtheit der deutschen Unternehmen, von denen im Zeitraum 1956 bis 1998 Stamm- und stimmrechtslose Vorzugsaktien börsennotiert waren. Zwischen beiden Aktiengattungen besteht mit durchschnittlich 17,2 Prozentpunkten ein ökonomisch und...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620775
Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090
incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470
the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the reputational value of following a norm. First, incentives can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432
things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient … administered incentives. -- principal agent ; experiment ; specific human capital …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882
performance elasticities are contrary to predictions of agency theory. Both results provide further support to the common belief … that compensation contracts in public corporations seem imperfectly tied to firm performance and managers' tasks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578030