Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 263
Cover Image
A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games : an experimental study
Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - 2002
show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without … by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants. -- cooperation ; experiment ; public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627290
Cover Image
Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765
Cover Image
Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
Cover Image
Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579
Cover Image
Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets : experimental evidence
Kübler, Dorothea; Müller, Wieland - 2001
, just as predicted by the theory, whereas average follower prices are not above average prices in the simultaneous market … simultaneous-move markets whereas first movers do not. As in theory, there is a significant first-mover disadvantage when firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009617949
Cover Image
Absent–minded drivers in the lab : testing Gilboa’s model
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 2000
This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583877
Cover Image
An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information
Dufwenberg, Martin; Genîzî, Ûrî; Güth, Werner; … - 2000
Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583886
Cover Image
Auctions and fair division games : a cross-cultural bidding experiment
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2000
This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Germany and Bulgaria, and for different allocation rules (first vs. second price auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid function in both countries,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583890
Cover Image
Compensating the cooperators : is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible?
Bohnet, Iris; Kübler, Dorothea - 2000
prisoner’s dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral cooperation is lower than in the status quo version separates … in the status quo PD whereas there is no difference between cooperation rates if the two versions of the game were … assigned to participants. However, sorting is incomplete and cooperation deteriorates over time. The auction price does not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612572
Cover Image
Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876