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Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different … than single bids. This allows us to examine whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We … find that within the time horizon which we investigate, learning does not drive toward risk neutral equilibrium bidding and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Robust learning experiments : evidence for learning and deliberation

Güth, Werner - 2000

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612041

Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory

Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2000

We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612571

Species survival and evolutionary stability in sustainable habitats : the concept of ecological stability

Aumann, Robert J.; Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.

competition and analyze the conditions for species survival. The second aspect refers to success in intraspecies competition of … (geno-) types as in evolutionary biology and game theory. Survival in inter- and intraspecies competition together with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578002

To commit or not to commit : endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580476

Stackelberg beats Cournot : on collusion and efficiency in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. For …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580482

How competition in investing, hiring, and selling affects (un)employment : an analysis of equilibrium scenario

Berninghaus, Siegfried; Güth, Werner; Ramser, Hans Jürgen - 1999

Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects … by price competition. A special advantage of such a framework is that one can distinguish two kinds of employment effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582404

Simultaneous over- and underconfidence : evidence from experimental asset markets

Maciejovsky, Boris; Kirchler, Erich - 2001

In this paper individual overconfidence within the context of an experimental asset market is investigated. Overall, 72 participants traded one risky asset on six markets of 12 participants each. The results indicate that individuals were not generally overconfident. Moreover, overconfidence was...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614297

Through trial & error to collusion

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461

Does cascade behavior in information cascades reflect Bayesian updating? : an experimental study

Oberhammer, Clemens; Stiehler, Andreas - 2001

Updating behavior in cascade experiments is usually investigated on the basis of urn prediction. But urn predictions alone can only provide a very rough information on individual updating behavior. Therefore, we implement a BDM mechanism. Subjects have to submit maximum prices that they are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613603