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On the regulation of social norms
Kübler, Dorothea - 2000
A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884
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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999
Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090
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Hedging the standard of living via cost of living index futures
Schulz, Rainer - 2000
People dislike inflation because inflation erodes the real value of future nominal income and wealth. Adjustment of future nominal values via a cost of living index is an appropriate way to handle the problem of real income risk. Nonetheless an important aspect needs more discussion: If markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612030
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?
Kübler, Dorothea - 1997
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470
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On the wages of temporary help service workers in Germany
Kvasnicka, Michael; Werwatz, Axel - 2002
This paper produces first econometric estimates for Germany of the contemporanous wage gap associated with Temporary Help Service (THS) employment, as well as the long-term effects of THS work on the future earnings of workers. In addition, we present evidence showing that average male real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009626745
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Estimating wage losses of displaced workers in Germany
Burda, Michael C.; Mertens, Antje - 1999
This paper investigates the effect of displacement on reemployment wages of socially insured West German workers who became unemployed in 1986. Because detailed information on the cause of job loss is unavailable, displacement status is imputed using a probit estimated on the German...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580479
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432
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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment
Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999
Dismissal rules, i.e. legally enforced long term contracts, have beem defended against criticism for, among other things, providing efficient incentives to invest in relationship specific skills. However, in many situations efficient investment can also be attained by spot contracts. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882