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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999
design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers … observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive …Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090
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Evolutionary norm enforcement
Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel - 1999
Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581088
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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583432
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Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment
Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999
two period game, involving the choke of the contract; length by the principal and an investment choke by the agent. In … contrast to the game theoretic predictions, we find that investment of the worker and length of contract; are strictly … although the model is fully deterministic. This could imply a behaviorally relevant difference between contract and market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472
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Quantile hedging
Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998
In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876
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On model based seasonal adjustment procedures
Breitung, Jörg - 1998
In this note the unobserved component approach underlying the software package SEATS is compared with the Beveridge-Nelson type of decomposition for seasonal time series. The main strength of the SEATS approach lies in the appealing model formulation and the careful specification and adjustment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574877
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The monetary model of the exchange rate : a structural interpretation
Moersch, Mathias; Nautz, Dieter - 1998
We emphasize the importance of properly identifying the long-run relations underlying the monetary model of the exchange rate. The separate estimation of long-run money demands leads to a "structural" error correction equation which allows an interpretation of the various channels affecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574885
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Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.
Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886
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Smooth discrimination analysis
Mammen, Enno; Cybakov, Aleksandr B. - 1998
Discriminant analysis for two data sets in IRd with probability densities f and g can be based on the estimation of the set G = {x : f(x) ≥ g(x)}. We consider applications where it is appropriate to assume that the region G has a smooth boundary. In particular, this assumption makes sense if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574887