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Default compensator, incomplete information, and the term structure of credit spreads

Giesecke, Kay - 2001

We provide a framework for the analysis of term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds in the presence of informational asymmetries. While bond investors observe default incidents, we suppose that they have incomplete information on the firm's assets and/or the threshold asset level at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620780

Giesecke, Kay - 2001

We propose a model of correlated multi-firm default with incomplete information. While public bond investors observe issuers' assets and defaults, we suppose that they are not informed about the threshold asset level at which a firm is liquidated. Bond investors form instead a prior on these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621426

An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Güth, Werner; Engelmann, Dirk - 1999

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582410

The local power of some unit root tests for panel data

Breitung, Jörg - 1999

(1993) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) suggest bias adjusted t-statistics. Such corrections are necessary to account for the … affected by two different terms. The first term represents the asymptotic effect on the bias due the detrending method and the … do not require a bias correction. The results of a Monte Carlo experiment suggest that avoiding the bias can improve the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581103

Measurement error, biases, and the validation of complex models

Carroll, Raymond J.; Galindo, Christian D. - 1997

There are three major points to this article: 1. Measurement error causes biases in regression fits. The line one would obtain if one could accurately measure exposure to environmental lead media will differ in important ways when one measures exposure with error. 2. The effects of measurement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009631751

I want you! : an experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power

Brandts, Jordi; Güth, Werner; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625802

Quantile hedging

Föllmer, Hans; Leukert, Peter - 1998

In a complete financial market every contingent claim can be hedged perfectly. In an incomplete market it is possible to stay on the safe side by superhedging. But such strategies may require a large amount of initial capital. Here we study the question what an investor can do who is unwilling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574876

On model based seasonal adjustment procedures

Breitung, Jörg - 1998

In this note the unobserved component approach underlying the software package SEATS is compared with the Beveridge-Nelson type of decomposition for seasonal time series. The main strength of the SEATS approach lies in the appealing model formulation and the careful specification and adjustment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574877

The monetary model of the exchange rate : a structural interpretation

Moersch, Mathias; Nautz, Dieter - 1998

We emphasize the importance of properly identifying the long-run relations underlying the monetary model of the exchange rate. The separate estimation of long-run money demands leads to a "structural" error correction equation which allows an interpretation of the various channels affecting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574885

Sequential versus independent commitment : an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules

Güth, Werner - 1998 - Rev.

Rational bargaining behavior depends crucially on the rules of bargaining, especially on whether parties decide sequentially or independently. Whereas in ultimatum bargaining the proposer can exploit the responder, independent commitments result in more balanced payoffs. To limit the scope of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574886

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