Similar Search Results

The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK

Renneboog, Luc; Trojanowski, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders.We find that both the CEO's industry-adjusted monetary compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092291

When to fire bad managers : The role of collusion between management and board of directors

Rebers, E.; Beetsma, R.M.W.J.; Peters, H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092512

Dividend Policy of German Firms

Renneboog, Luc; Goergen, M.; Correia Da Silva, L. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows than UK and US firms.However, on a published profits basis, the pattern is reversed.Company law provisions and accounting policies account for these conflicting results.A partial adjustment model is used to estimate the implicit target...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092638

Insider Trading, Option Exercises and Private Benefits of Control (Revision of DP 2010-32)

de Goeij, Peter; Renneboog, Luc; Cziraki, P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of employing many anti-shareholder mechanisms limiting shareholders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092693

Corporate Governance Structures, Control and Performance in European Markets : A Tale of Two Systems

Renneboog, Luc; Crama, Y.; Leruth, L.; Urbain, J-P. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

Traditionally share price returns and their variance have been explained by factors linked to the operations of the company such as systematic risk, corporate size and P/E ratios or by factors related to the influence of the macro-economic environment. In these models, the institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092775

Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholder-Based Governance Regimes

Renneboog, Luc; Koke, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on total factor productivity growth for two large samples of German and UK firms. In poorly performing UK firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders lead to substantial increases in productivity....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092792

Shareholding Cascades : The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium

Renneboog, Luc; Becht, M.C.; Chapelle, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999

This paper analyses the control of Belgian listed companies. The analysis reveals that control of listed companies in Belgium is highly concentrated. Business groups, holding companies, and voting pacts, play an important role in bringing about this concentration. The main characteristics of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092838

Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies

Renneboog, Luc; Dherment-Ferere, I. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000

This study has analysed the share price reactions to changes in top management.A distinction was made among different …. Subsequently, a more detailed classification of the change of top management was made based on the background of the successor (an …, there is evidence that forced turnover is facilitated.It also seems that it is easier to remove management in smaller …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092880

Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor their Investee Firms?

Renneboog, Luc; Goergen, M.; Zhang, C. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

firm’s future value to other outside shareholders and reduce the informational asymmetry between the managers and the …As institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most listed UK firms, one expects them to monitor the firms … directors’ trades. If institutional shareholders act as monitors, their monitoring activities convey new information about a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090281

Control Structures and Payout Policy

Renneboog, Luc; Trojanowski, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005

weakens the relationship between corporate earnings and payout dynamics.While the impact of the voting power of shareholders … block holders (i.e. industrial firms, outside individuals, directors, financial institutions).The controlling shareholders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090300