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Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C.; Wickhorst, Hanke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727202

Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study

Stoll, Sebastian; Zöttl, Gregor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures … that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106292

Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts

Fahn, Matthias - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The need to give incentives is usually absent in the literature on minimum wages. However, especially in the service sector it is important how well a job is done, and employees must be incentivized to perform accordingly. Furthermore, many aspects regarding service quality cannot be verified,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010768961

Preferences for Data Privacy: Sharing Personal Information with Close and Distant Peers

Schudy, Simeon; Utikal, Verena - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We provide evidence that people have preferences for data privacy and show that these preferences partly reflect people’s interest in controlling who receives their private information. Participants of an experiment face the decision to share validated personal information with peers. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210884

Political Booms, Financial Crises

Herrera, Helios; Ordoñez, Guillermo; Trebesch, Christoph - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210891

Promises and Image Concerns

Schütte, Miriam; Thoma, Carmen - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communication can be an effective tool to increase trust and enhance cooperation. This paper focuses on reasons why people stick to a given promise and analyzes to what extent image concerns of being perceived as a promise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106295

Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy

Hainz, Christa - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121197

"Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations

Hendel, Ulrich - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signaling game. The terrorists, taking into account the government's counter-terrorism response to first period attacks, gain additional manpower from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897325

Optimal Opacity on Financial Markets

Siegert, Caspar - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We analyze the incentives for information disclosure in financial markets. We show that borrowers may have incentives to voluntarily withhold information and that doing so is most attractive for claims that are inherently hard to value, such as portfolios of subprime mortgages. Interestingly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897340