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Seller Competition by Mechanism Design
Damianov, Damian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835726
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The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
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Bundled procurement
Chen, Yongmin; Li, Jianpei - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
prices associated with separate purchase. (Pure) bundling is more likely to be selected as a procurement strategy when: (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240256
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Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests
Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C.; Wickhorst, Hanke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727202
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Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments
Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known differences is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527359
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Mechanism Design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in Distributed Information Systems
Papakonstantinou, A.; Rogers, A; Gerding, E. H.; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly forecast of a future event (such as a meteorological phenomenon) or a probabilistic estimate of a specific parameter (such as the quality of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109324
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A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
Papakonstantinou, A.; Rogers, A.; Gerding, E. H.; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estimate or forecast of a specified precision and report it truthfully to a centre. Our mechanism is applied in a setting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112666
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Mechanism Design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision
Papakonstantinou, A.; Rogers, A.; Gerding, E. H; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258050
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Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study
Stoll, Sebastian; Zöttl, Gregor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures … that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106292
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The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158