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auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835726
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
prices associated with separate purchase. (Pure) bundling is more likely to be selected as a procurement strategy when: (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240256
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727202
Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known differences is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527359
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly forecast of a future event (such as a meteorological phenomenon) or a probabilistic estimate of a specific parameter (such as the quality of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109324
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estimate or forecast of a specified precision and report it truthfully to a centre. Our mechanism is applied in a setting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112666
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258050
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures … that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106292
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158