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Financing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint

Gautier, Axel; Mitra, Manipushpak - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The … optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more … property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001499

Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001503

Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - University of Bonn, Germany - 2000

and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that among a more general and natural class of sequencing problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989617

The Delegation Perspective on Representative Democracy

Hain, Roland; Mitra, Manipushpak - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

Why do political constituencies delegate decision power to representative assemblies? And how is the size of such assemblies determined? We analyze these questions of constitutional design in a model with voters learning their preferred alternative only after engaging in costly information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989618

Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility

Gautier, Axel; Mitra, Manipushpak - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968359

Simple Sequencing Problems with Interdependent Costs

Mitra, Manipushpak; Hain, Roland - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001

In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968380