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Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
Garratt, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculatorâ …€”a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient … makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785796
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The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known
Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968329
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Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
Garrat, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a … bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient … makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968344
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Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Tröger, Thomas; Mylovanov, Tymofiy - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008
We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968418
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Collusion via Resale
Tröger, Thomas; Garratt, Rodney; Zheng, Charles - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968458
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A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle-Model
Nöldeke, Georg; Tröger, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle's model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785922
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On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Rochet-Vila Model of Market Making
Nöldeke, Georg; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
This paper derives necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of linear equilibria in the Rochet-Vila model of market making. In contrast to most previous work on the existence of linear equilibria in models of market making, we do not impose independence of the underlying random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968334
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Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders
Nöldeke, Georg; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
We consider Kyle's market order model of insider trading with multiple informed traders and show: if a linear equilibrium exists for two different numbers of informed traders, asset payoff and noise trading are independent and have finite second moments, then these random variables are normally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001504
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A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilbria in the Kyle-Model
Nöldeke, Georg; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle's model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032220