This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.

[E. Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38] is a seminal paper in the field of mechanism design and implementation theory. [J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991)...

Quantum mechanics has been applied to game theory for years. A recent work [H. Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat ``bad'' social choice rules. \emph{International Journal of Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted). Also see http://arxiv.org/pdf/1002.4294v3] has generalized quantum mechanics...

Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1)...

In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. Furthermore, by using an algorithmic Bayesian...

[Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.}...

This paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in subgame perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are satisfied, the traditional characterization on subgame perfect implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum stage mechanism....

Mechanism design, a reverse problem of game theory, is an important branch of economics. Nash implementation is the cornerstone of the theory of mechanism design. The well-known Maskin's theorem describes the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation when the number of agents are at least...

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian...