Showing 1 - 7 of 7
It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in governmentaccountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government mayinfluence news content by maintaining a "cozy" relationship with the media. Thispaper develops a model of democratic politics in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305060
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1)individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions onurban growth. We embed these three elements in a model of a dynamic economy with twosources of friction:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005151126
CEOs affect the performance of the firms they manage, and family CEOs seem to weaken it. Yet little is known about what top executives actually do, and whether it differs by firm ownership. We study CEOs in the Indian manufacturing sector, where family ownership is widespread and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720264
We re-visit the single-agent mechanism design problem with quasi-linear preferences, but we assume that the principal knowingly operates on the basis of only an approximate type space rather than the (potentially complex) truth. We propose a two-step scheme, the profit-participation mechanism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838684
People choose where to live and how much to invest in housing. Traditionally, the first decision has been the domain of spatial economics, while the second has been analyzed in finance. Spatial asset pricing is an attempt to combine equilibrium concepts from both disciplines. In the finance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838686
CEOs affect the performance of the firms they manage, and family CEOs seem to weaken it. Yet little is known about what top executives actually do, and whether it differs by firm ownership. We study CEOs in the Indian manufacturing sector, where family ownership is widespread and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099320
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. It is the latter kind that can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670682