Showing 1 - 10 of 17
We study the interaction of organizational culture and personal prosocial orientation in team work where teams compete against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative organizational cultures emphasizing either self-enhancement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511325
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research … focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we …-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511332
distributions are uncertain, models of ambiguity aversion suggest that tournaments may become more attractive than independent wage … tournaments and independent contracts, which are designed in a way that under uncertainty about output distribution (that is …, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer tournaments, while ambiguity neutral agents prefer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009143373
We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low paid agents to reduce effiort. We control for intentionality of wages by either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a random process. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008464021
Envy and altruism have been studied extensively in adults. Here, we report data from an experiment studying envious and … treatments. One treatment investigates envy, the other one studies altruism. Additionally, we collect data on the children …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008641432
This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt’ thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358951
We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel II capital requirements, this quality is either fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509437
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511336
There is substantial evidence that new banks and rapidly growing banks are risk prone. We study this problem by designing a relationship-lending model in which a bank operates as a financial intermediary and centralised monitor. In the absence of deposit insurance, the bank’s limited liability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005648834
The paper analyzes bank loan supply in a simple value maximizing partial equilibrium framework. The focus is on the role of bank capital, capital regulation and the pricing of bank liabilities. The model is constructed so as to resemble the situation of the Finnish local banks in the late 1980s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005648913