This publication consists of fifteen studies on payment and settlement systems conducted using computational or simulation techniques. The studies have been presented at the simulator seminars arranged by the Bank of Finland during the years 2009–2011. The main focus of the studies is on the...

On 3 July 2015, SUERF organized its sixth joint conference with the Bank of Finland in Helsinki on the subject of liquidity and market efficiency. The one-day program consisted of an opening speech, six presentations, including three keynotes, and a lunchtime address. The present SUERF Study...

This paper presents first steps toward robust early-warning models. We conduct a horse race of conventional statistical methods and more recent machine learning methods. As early-warning models based upon one approach are oftentimes built in isolation of other methods, the exercise is of high...

Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term debt that has to be refinanced before the asset matures. We show that in this setting maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that the existence of social externalities of bank failures further lowers...

This discussion paper presents a microsimulation model of household distress. We use logit analysis to estimate the extent to which a household’s risk of being financially distressed depends on net income after tax and loan servicing costs. The impact of assumed macroeconomic shocks on this...

We suggest a complementary tool for financial stability analysis based on stochastic simulation of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) of the macro economy. The paper relates to financial stability research in which financial aggregates crucial to financial stability are...

Systemic bank problems arise for a large number of causes and in spite of both active banking supervision and market discipline. Once a problem has emerged, swift action is needed to limit further losses, avoid financial destabilization, and regain efficient markets. The restructuring exercise...

The banking system is known to be vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors’ coordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent certain types of systemic crises by eliminating the possibility of the coordination failure.