This paper analyses bank exit (ie reorganisation and liquidation) legislation in selected financial centres: New York, London, Frankfurt, Helsinki and Tokyo. The focus is on bank exit legislation applicable to commercial banks. The legislation is analysed from the perspective of bank...

In financial market studies, public supervision has rarely been found to have any effects on financial market development. This is true, even though the primary objective of supervisory legislation is the limitation of market failures and externalities. Studies conducted by eg the World Bank and...

In the light of the inequity of the way losses from bank insolvencies and their avoidance through intervention by the authorities have been distributed over creditors, depositors, owners and the population at large in transition and emerging economies, this paper explores a number of regulatory...

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provides a more efficient mechanism for dealing with problem banks operating in more than one European country. In a PCA framework, a bank’s losses are likely to be substantially reduced. This reduction in the losses to deposit insurance and governments will...

This is the first paper that examines economies of scale in stock exchanges. The data employed in the study include cost and output statistics for 37 stock exchanges in four continents around the world for the year 1997. I estimate two traditional cost functions and find that ray (overall) scale...

This paper investigates the existence and extent of economies of scale and scope among stock exchanges. Evidence from 38 exchanges in 32 countries and 4 continents around the world for the years 1989-1998 indicates the existence of significant economies of scale and scope. The degree of such...

The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 has given rise to new regulatory initiatives to put restrictions on the size and the term of bankers' pay. We revisit both theoretically and empirically the question of whether these regulations are justified. We model bonuses as a series of sequential...

We model a banker's future bonuses as a series of call options on the bank's profits and show that bonus caps and deferrals reduce risk-taking. However, the banker's optimal risk-taking also depends on the costs of risk-taking. We calibrate the model to US banking data and show that lengthening...