designing a relationship-lending model in which a bank operates as a financial intermediary and centralised monitor. In the … absence of deposit insurance, the bank’s limited liability option creates an incentive problem between the bank and its …, the bank must signal its safety to depositors by maintaining the equity ratio held. The optimal equity ratio is dynamic …

is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition. If … the bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. In that …

disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the … bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory examination if it fails to issue subdebt. By forcing banks to be examined …-destroying actions to benefit themselves, but may also encourage banks to lower asset risk. It shows that subdebt regulation and bank …

We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition in … which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel II …

This paper examines blanket guarantee and restructuring decisions in respect of a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash … bargaining, when the threat of a panic motivates countries to take decisions quickly. The failure of the bank would cause …, the bank is either liquidated or one – or both of the countries – recapitalizes it. The partition of the recapitalisation …

, fails to hold in an environment where consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the …