Many adverse selection models of standard one-period debt contracts are based on the following seemingly innocuous assumptions. First, entrepreneurs have private information about the quality of their return distributions. Second, return distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood-ratio...

We study a financial market adverse selection model where all agents are endowed with initial wealth and choose to invest as entrepreneurs or financiers, or not to invest. We show that often a lack of outside finance leads to the emergence of financial markets where availability of outside...

We study the interaction between private and public funding of innovative projects in the presence of adverse-selection based financing constraints. Government programmes allocating direct subsidies are based on ex-ante screening of the subsidy applications. This selection scheme may yield...

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt’ thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory...

We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel II capital requirements, this quality is either fully...

The paper considers a model in which limited liability causes an asset substitution problem for banks. The problem can at times become so severe that the current regulatory framework – based on a combination of effectively full deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and prudential...

There is substantial evidence that new banks and rapidly growing banks are risk prone. We study this problem by designing a relationship-lending model in which a bank operates as a financial intermediary and centralised monitor. In the absence of deposit insurance, the bank’s limited liability...

The paper analyzes bank loan supply in a simple value maximizing partial equilibrium framework. The focus is on the role of bank capital, capital regulation and the pricing of bank liabilities. The model is constructed so as to resemble the situation of the Finnish local banks in the late 1980s...

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when the riskiness of banks is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition. If the bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan...